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The article considers why the United States only grants a deduction for charitable 
contributions made to US charities from a historic standpoint and why doing so is 
problematic in the fight against global ills.  The Charitable Deduction Games examines an 
alternative approach to cross-border giving that is currently spreading throughout the 
European Union (“EU”) as a result of the 2009 landmark case Hein Persche v. Finanzamt 
Ludenscheid.  After an examination of Persche, the article explores the UK model that has 
resulted in response to the decision and considers why the US should adopt a similar 
model.  Next, the article considers why the Netherlands has been reluctant to adopt a 
similar model in light of its historic stance.  Finally, The Charitable Deduction Games 
examines the responses of various EU Member States to Persche and concludes with a 
proposal of how Persche should affect US laws governing cross-border giving. 
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In today’s charitable world, many of the causes that have captured the attention of 
global philanthropists and organizations alike are international in nature.  Gone are the days 
when US charities and the individuals and corporations who give to them are focused only 
on what is happening within the borders of the US in spite of economic hardship at home.  
In 2008, international funding represented almost 25% of overall giving in the US.1  Most 
of the international grants comprising the recent growth in this area were exceptionally 
large, at $10 million or more.2  Also, significantly, the vast majority of the funders were 
independent foundations, rather than corporate foundations, which suggests individual 
donors are more focused on international philanthropic goals, and thus, laws that affect 
their behavior should be scrutinized carefully.3   
As new international funders enter the global giving scene, it is clear that 
alleviating suffering abroad and world plights is on the conscience of American 
philanthropists.  Significantly, one independent foundation, the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation (“Gates Foundation”), accounted for more than two out of five international 
grant dollars in 2008 and provided almost 44 percent of international grant dollars.4  One 
of the largest new funders is the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, a California 
foundation which gave $115,376,014 in international grant dollars in 2008.5   
Should not a philanthropic CEO of a major US corporation who has donated to the 
American Red Cross be able to make the same tax-efficient donations to its UK equivalent 
if he has had to relocate to London?  Should we require instead that the UK charity set up 
a US charity or seek administratively burdensome registration in the US?  Both of these 
options come at a price that could be used to provide disaster relief rather than to 
circumvent a perhaps well-meaning but misplaced set of rules.  The barrier to the CEO’s 
giving is the result of a notion present not only in the US’s set of charitable giving rules 
but also in those of the UK and most European Union (“EU”) countries.  I will refer to that 
notion as the “notion of territoriality.”   
The notion of territoriality is a country's restriction of income tax deductibility to 
those donations made to charities formed within its given borders, and not allowing 
deductibility for donations made to charities formed in other countries (“foreign charities”).  
Both US and UK charitable laws have afforded primacy to this notion, whereas since 2008, 
the charitable laws of the Netherlands stand in sharp contrast; after a landmark decision by 
the European Court of Justice,6 the laws of most EU member states provide an even more 
pronounced contrast.  A few years ago, the Netherlands became the first country to provide 
a full income tax deduction to charities established within the EU or in the US (i.e., to 
significantly diminish the importance of the notion of territoriality in its cross-border 
charitable law framework).  Interestingly, the UK has modified its law significantly, and 
                                               
1 Steven Lawrence & Reina Mukai, International Grantmaking Update: A Snapshot of U.S. 
Foundation Trends, FOUND. CTR. (Dec. 2010), http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/pdf/intl_u 
pdate_2010.pdf (explaining that corporate foundations were responsible for 4.8% of international grant dollar 
s expended). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. (noting that independent foundations were responsible for 92% of the 2008 international grant 
dollars given). 
4 Id. 
5 Id.  
6 Case C-318/07, Hein Persche v. Finanzamt Ludenscheid, 2009 E.C.R. I-359.  
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in comparison with the UK and other EU member states, the Netherlands has fallen behind 
in the march towards helping donors give internationally.7  At the same time, the notion of 
territoriality in practice alleviates some concerns about oversight and the funneling of 
donated funds to terrorist activities.  While the complexities associated with implementing 
a revised cross-border charitable deduction regime that takes account of these concerns 
will be more fully explored in the second article of this series, this article presents the issue 
and introduces a framework for a comprehensive solution based on prior efforts to confront 
the problem. 
The notion of territoriality is endemic in the charitable laws of the US, the UK, and 
the EU, particularly the Netherlands.  This article will address aspects of the notion of 
territoriality in all three sets of charitable laws.  Part I of this article will define the notion 
of territoriality and examine the historical reasons for it; Part II will discuss why the notion 
of territoriality is problematic; and Part III will explore the solution proposed by the EU in 
a landmark case and how the US may adapt its laws in light of the change and historic 
notions discussed.   
I. THE NOTION OF TERRITORIALITY: DEFINED, HISTORICALLY 
EXAMINED, AND FOUND WANTING 
The charitable laws of the US and of other nations reflect the notion of territoriality 
or the restriction of tax relief to those charitable contributions made only to domestic 
charities.  Following is an examination of the US charitable law setting forth this notion 
and its historical underpinnings.  I also will examine this notion in regard to the UK and 
other EU member states.  
 US – Current Notion of Territoriality 
Donors are allowed US income tax deductions for charitable contributions made 
to or for the use of charities created or organized in the US, or in any US possession or 
those formed under the laws of the US, any State, the District of Columbia, or any US 
possession (“US domestic charities”).8  Noted tax scholar David Pozen refers to the notion 
of territoriality as “our water’s edge policy” and explains that it conditions “income tax 
deductibility on the donee’s domestic situs.” 9   The only exceptions to the notion of 
territoriality appear in the context of estate and gift taxation contributions10 and those made 
in regard to certain bilateral tax treaties the US has with Israel, Canada, and Mexico.11  It 
is important to note that foreign charities have always been eligible to apply for US tax-
exempt status,12 but practically speaking this is not an option since it would force the 
charity to convert all of its accounting to US dollars and methods (i.e., GAAP), and force 
compliance with the annual IRS filing requirement (i.e., Form 990 or 990-PF), which is 
impractical and costly if the foreign charity is using a different fiscal year.  Even if a foreign 
                                               
7 Taxation: Commission refers The Netherlands to Court over tax discrimination against foreign 
charities, EUROPA (Apr. 6, 2011), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/429 (citing 
§ 60 of Case C-318/07, Hein Persche, 2009 E.C.R. I-359). 
8 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).  
9 David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 540 (2006). 
10 See I.R.C. §§ 2055, 2522 (2012).  Cf.  I.R.C. §§ 2522(b)(2)–(3), 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2012) which 
impose restrictions related to the notion of territoriality on nonresidents in the context of estate and gift 
taxation.  See also Pozen, supra note 9. 
11 See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 9.   
12 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 66-177, 1966-1 C.B. 132. 
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charity were to obtain US tax-exempt status, donors who made US contributions to it would 
not receive US tax deductions because of the notion of territoriality.13  Thus, generally 
speaking, donors do not receive US income tax deductions for charitable contributions to 
foreign charities.   
Donors may still fund foreign charitable activities provided they use a US 
intermediary.  Specifically, there are two options available for donors desiring to receive a 
US tax deduction for a contribution that funds foreign charitable activities: a non-corporate 
donor may make a donation to a US charity (1) that is engaged in foreign charitable 
activities itself or (2) that will make a decision to fund a foreign charity engaging in such 
activity.14  The historic reasons advanced for this peculiar notion form a web of ambiguity, 
which suggests the notion was ill-founded and lends support to an argument the notion 
should be afforded less primacy in US charitable giving law. 
 US – History of the Notion of Territoriality 
In examining the history of the notion of territoriality in the US, one discovers that 
it was not always present in our tax law.  In early days, the income tax law in the US 
allowed US tax deductions for charitable contributions to foreign charities.  The restriction 
to only US charities did not appear until over twenty years later.  From 1917–1938, the 
notion of territoriality simply did not exist in the context of individual tax deductions and 
was born with the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1938.15  Perhaps more tellingly, the 
reasons advanced for the notion of territoriality, evident in the following quote from the 
legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1938, have long been disputed as inaccurate and 
ill-founded:16 
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable 
or other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is 
compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens 
which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds 
and by benefits resulting from the promotion of general welfare.  The 
United States derives no such benefit from gifts to foreign institutions, and 
the proposed limitation is consistent with the above theory.  If the 
recipient, however, is a domestic organization the fact that some portion 
of its funds is used in other countries for charitable and other purposes 
(such as missionary and educational purposes) will not affect the 
deductibility of the gift.17 
Tax scholars have rightly taken issue with the historical reason advanced for the 
notion of territoriality.  From an ideological standpoint, it does not make sense.  Professor 
                                               
13 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2012). 
14 See Pozen, supra note 9, at 541 (citing Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2 C.B. 101.). 
15 The Revenue Act of 1938 introduced the notion of territoriality in the context of corporate 
charitable deductions by only granting tax deductions to donations made to US charities and, where the 
charity was not a corporate entity, donations for domestic use.  See Pozen, supra note 9, at 542; JAMES J. 
FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 696 (4th 
ed. 2010).   
16 Eric M. Zolt, Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions: Domestic Activities, Foreign 
Activities, or None of the Above, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 361 (2012).  
17 H.R. Rep. No. 75-1860, at 19–20 (1938). 
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Harvey Dale’s renowned article on international deductions addresses some of the 
problems with the notion of territoriality.18   
The notion of territoriality has been described correctly as “bad history, bad 
philosophy, and bad logic.”19  In terms of the first critique of “bad history,” there is no 
former congressional requirement that only contributions to charities that relieve the US 
government of an expense should entitle donors to a US tax deduction.20  As Pozen notes, 
“No one today would defend the drafters’ argument that foreign charities should not receive 
deductible gifts because, unlike domestic charities, they do not alleviate governmental 
burdens.”21  Pozen argues that if this were the case, the rule would be both under-inclusive 
and over-inclusive.  In terms of the former, he states there are nonprofits that entitle donors 
to a tax deduction, such as religious organizations, which do not provide governmental 
services.22  Pozen also comments that it would be over-inclusive since many for-profit 
contractors do provide governmental services but donations to them are not tax 
deductible.23  (While I agree with Pozen’s overall characterization of the drafters’ reason 
as indefensible, I would disagree with his point about religious charities given the number 
of churches which run programs to assist with the poor and homeless.)   
In addition, if the drafters’ historical reason for the notion is accurate, it would 
mean that our approach to US income tax deductibility is riddled with inconsistency.  
Clearly, there are numerous US charities that engage in charitable work that the US 
government does not endeavor to undertake.  Nevertheless, donors to such US charities 
receive a US income tax deduction.  What about foreign charities that engage in foreign 
charitable work that the US government does in fact undertake?  Are not those foreign 
charities relieving the US government of an expense, specifically foreign aid?  There must 
be another salient feature that leads to tax deductibility, and many academics have 
addressed this issue.  My point is that the historical reason on record is an inadequate one.  
It cannot possibly serve as an accurate justification for the rule. 
It has also been argued that the historical reason advanced is “bad philosophy.”24  
The thought expressed in the legislative history reflects a limited worldview and 
perspective of global philanthropy.25  If the US adopted the type of philosophy underlying 
the drafters’ argument, it would quickly find that accusations of isolationism and even 
indifference would result.  This is also a valid criticism although perhaps the least 
persuasive in terms of a legal analysis of the problem; as a result, I will devote more 
attention to the final criticism.   
Finally, the historic reason advanced evinces “bad logic.”26  Why should we deny 
a US tax deduction based on where the charity is formed (i.e., deny a deduction in the case 
of a foreign charity) when we do not limit where a US charity may carry out its charitable 
activity (i.e., permit a deduction in the case of a US charity engaged in foreign charitable 
                                               
18 Harvey P. Dale, Foreign Charities, 48 TAX LAW. 655 (1995).  
19 Id. at 660–61.  
20 See Zolt, supra note 16, at 391.   
21 Pozen, supra note 9, at 545.   
22 Id.   
23 Id.  
24 Dale, supra note 18, at 661. 
25 Id.  
26 Id. 
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work)?27  The Internal Revenue Code (“Code” or “I.R.C.”) and tax precedent has no 
shortage of references to the prevailing nature of substance over form in the administration 
of tax law.  If in substance a foreign charity and a US charity are the same, one may argue 
that their respective places of incorporation should not operate to negate a benefit otherwise 
due.  Allowing the triumph of form, and specifically residence, has caused a number of 
problems in the offshore world, and these lessons should inform our conception of current 
cross-border charitable law.  Allowing taxpayers to game the system and to defer US tax 
simply by incorporating in a certain jurisdiction, without much regard to the substance of 
business being conducted there, has led to a host of problems and lost revenue.28  Have we 
not learned the importance of looking through places of incorporation to determine what is 
being done, i.e., examining substance?  In the cross-border charitable giving world, the 
substance of the work done by a foreign charity and a US charity may be the exact same.  
In the US, a charity that allows a donor to receive a tax deduction must have the substance 
of I.R.C. section 501(c)(3).  In other words, it must be organized and operated exclusively 
for one of the purposes listed in this provision, namely, inter alia, a “religious, charitable, 
scientific, literary, or educational purpose.”29  Under a pivotal case from 1980, the Internal 
Revenue Service ("IRS") held that such an accepted charitable purpose may be carried out 
completely abroad.30   If a foreign charity is also established for one of the accepted 
charitable purposes under I.R.C. section 501(c)(3), the substance of what it is doing has 
already been approved as entitling donors to a tax deduction (even if the work is carried 
out completely abroad).  If we have decided the substance of a charity merits a tax 
deduction for a donor, then why should such a deduction be denied based on form, or in 
other words, where it has been incorporated?   
In some cases, the substance of what foreign charities are doing may exceed what 
US charities are doing in terms of carrying out a given charitable purpose.  One advantage, 
as Professor Eric Zolt points out, of placing US and foreign charities on par with each other 
is that it would foster having tax subsidies go to the charities that are “the most efficient 
providers of charitable services.”31  Arguably, foreign charities that are more effective 
providers should receive more favor from the US system than less effective US charities.  
As the US charitable law currently stands, more effective foreign charities are not receiving 
even the same treatment as less effective US charities.  I would argue that residence in the 
charitable context could be tied to where the work is occurring, and if that is the case, US 
charities conducting their charitable activities abroad should be deemed akin to foreign 
charities that are doing the same.  The only difference is where a few pieces of paper were 
filed.   
In addition, Dale suggests that the notion of territoriality is bad logic because if in 
fact the reason for it is to reduce the burden on the IRS in regard to oversight of charitable 
funds used abroad, this end may be accomplished through less drastic means than requiring 
a US intermediary.32  For example, he notes that the existing Code provisions regarding 
oversight could simply be strengthened to accomplish this objective.33  Perhaps even more 
                                               
27 Id.  
28 Michael J. Burns & James McConvill, An Unstoppable Force: The Offshore World in a Modern 
Global Economy, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 205, 205 (2011).  
29 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
30 See Bilingual Montessori Sch. of Paris v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 480 (1980).  
31 See Zolt, supra note 16, at 392.  
32 See Dale, supra note 18, at 663 nn.39–40. 
33 Id. at 663. 
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persuasively, the legislative history does not necessarily reflect any such concern with this 
burden in the first instance.34 
In attempting to find a historic reason for this notion, the searcher will leave empty-
handed.  Dale comments, “Congress has never provided a satisfactory explanation for a 
rule that, at least on gross examination, has an isolationist scent and that is, on the other 
hand, easily bypassed.”35  It has been posited that the notion of territoriality in the US is 
now “archaic,” specifically, a by-product of the Depression Era when the US was focused 
“inward on national recovery” and thus reflective of “an isolationist foreign policy.”36   
1. Implementation as Justification 
Although the initial drafters did not mention implementation as a reason for the 
notion of territoriality, observers and scholars incorrectly have touted it as the main reason 
it should remain a central part of US charitable giving law. 37   Oversight and 
administrability are the primary concerns advanced.38  Dale considers the argument that a 
US intermediary leads to simpler IRS oversight, but he ultimately rejects it.39  As an 
alternative, Dale asserts that a reporting system that entails more complete substantiation 
of foreign gifts and that operates within existing IRS rules would be a better solution.40  
“Friends of” organizations have been seen as a way to ease the burden on the IRS in terms 
of collecting and auditing foreign-based documents and records.41  As Dale points out, 
“there are other more suitable methods” for accomplishing this goal.42  One solution he 
proposes involves placing a larger burden on donors: donors would be required to 
substantiate their foreign charitable deductions under current Code section 170(f)(8). 43  
Code section 170(f)(8) requires donors to obtain substantiation in order to receive a 
deduction.44  It also authorizes regulations that will “carry out” this requirement.45  Dale 
advocates placing the burden on the donor since he/she will work harder at complying 
because the deduction will be at stake.46   
As Pozen posits, implementation should be based on a view of what an 
international deduction policy should achieve.47  Issues associated with implementation 
and a proposal for an implementation strategy will be addressed more fully later in this 
article and in a subsequent one.48  Confining the examination for now to the historic reason 
                                               
34 Pozen, supra note 9, at 543; Dale, supra note 18, at 663.   
35 John G. Simon, Laura B. Chisolm & Harvey P. Dale, The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable 
Contributions 1, 15–16 (June 25, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review) 
(citation omitted).  
36See Penina Kessler Lieber, 1601–2001: An Anniversary of Note, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 731,  741 
(2001). 
37 See Pozen, supra note 9, at 545. 
38 Id.  
39 See Dale, supra note 18, at 663.   
40 Id. 
41 Id.   
42 Id.   
43 Id. 
44 See I.R.C. § 170(f)(8) (2012). 
45 See Dale, supra note 18, at 696 n.40. 
46 See id. 
47 Pozen, supra note 9, at 545. 
48 This article is the first in a three-part series. 
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advanced for the notion of territoriality results in no other determination than an absence 
of real justification. 
2. Inconsistency with Other Charitable Giving Provisions 
The notion of territoriality seems to cut against some basic underlying policies the 
Code seeks to achieve.  First, it is not a consistently applied principle within the area of 
charitable giving.  Putting aside the argument that internationally-targeted donations, 
whether made to US charities or to foreign charities, should not result in a tax deduction,49 
if one considers the present state of charitable law, it is inescapable that it is wrought with 
inconsistency.  Nor can one argue that the notion of territoriality is embodied as a concept 
broadly in US charitable law.  It seems to apply only in the context of tax deductions.  
Neither the income tax exemption nor the estate and gift tax charitable deductions embody 
the notion.50  In other words, as stated earlier, there is no impediment to a foreign charity 
filing for tax-exempt status or to a donor that desires to make an estate and gift donation to 
a non-US charity (in most cases) in terms of receiving a tax deduction for such a donation.  
At the same time, as one academic has noted, one could argue that this notion is consistent 
with the Code’s goal of making international giving more difficult than domestic giving.51  
However, it is not clear that the difficulty should be of sufficient magnitude to serve as 
deterrence to international philanthropy. 
An examination of the history of the notion is not complete without an observation 
of its exceptions, and thus, they deserve attention as well.  Following is an overview of 
some salient portions of US charitable tax law that ignore the notion.   
a. Estate Tax and Gift Tax Deduction 
As mentioned earlier, the notion of territoriality is not embodied in the charitable 
laws regarding US estate and gift tax deductions.52  In other words, donors may receive  
US estate and gift tax deductions for  gifts to a US charity or a foreign charity.  Expressed 
simply, the notion of territoriality does not apply in the context of estate and gift tax 
deductions.  One must ask what makes estate and gift tax deductions merit special treatment 
and whether the same obstacles advanced as reasons to deny an income tax deduction under 
similar circumstances have been overcome in this area.   
b. Donations by Non-Charitable Domestic Trusts 
Under I.R.C. section 642, a trust permitted or required to make charitable 
contributions may receive a US income tax deduction for contributions to foreign charities 
and foreign governments.  Thus, “[c]ontributions to a foreign charity by a [section 642] 
trust . . . , for purposes described in [section] 170(c) are . . . deductible and, in addition, 
there are no percentage limitations on the amount of distributed income for which a 
                                               
49 See Pozen, supra note 9, at 545. 
50 See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 9, at 543. 
51 See, e.g., Darryll K. Jones, The Neglected Role of International Altruistic Investment in the 
Chinese Transition Economy, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 71, 118, 119–24 (2004) (citation omitted) (noting 
the following: IRS classification of unregistered charities as foundations, foreign tax credit’s failure to take 
into account international donations, and penalties applied on foundations that make non-US grants unless 
exacting “expenditure responsibility” is exercised.)   
52 See I.R.C. §§ 2055, 2522 (2012). 
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deduction may be claimed.”53  A deduction is allowed for "any contribution made for a 
purpose under [section] 170(c) without the limitations of [section] 170(c)(2)(A) [or in other 
words the notion of territoriality].”54  Not only is a deduction allowed for donations to 
foreign charities, but, additionally, the percentage limitations affecting donations by US 
individuals and US business corporations are not applicable.  An observation of the laws 
regarding tax deductions for trusts shows under-regulation in comparison to the individual 
context.  There is a sharp deviation from the notion of territoriality. 
c. Treaties in Force 
US treaties with Israel, Canada, and Mexico provide exceptions to the notion of 
territoriality.  In other words, donors may receive a deduction for contributions to Israeli, 
Canadian, or Mexican charities.  Following is an examination of these provisions: 
Israel 
Pursuant to Article 15A(1) of the US-Israel Income Tax Treaty,55 a US citizen or 
resident may receive a US income tax deduction for a donation to an Israeli charity that is 
(1) recognized as a charity under Israel’s income tax laws and (2) would be eligible to be 
treated as a US charity had it been formed in the US.  The amount of the US income tax 
deduction is limited to 25% of the donor’s Israel income.  Under Article 15A(2), Israeli 
residents who donate to US charities may receive tax relief in Israel and thus reciprocity 
exists.  As suggested earlier, this treaty exception seems to place the expected emphasis on 
substance, rather than “form.”  If an Israeli charity has the same substance as a US charity 
qualified to accept tax deductible donations, donors to it will be allowed a US tax 
deduction.   
 Canada 
Pursuant to Article XXI(5) of the US-Canada Income Tax Treaty,56 a US citizen 
or resident may receive a US income tax deduction for a donation to a Canadian charity 
that (1) is treated essentially as a charity by Canada and (2) would be eligible to be treated 
as a US charity if it were formed in the US, subject to certain limitations on amount.57  
Under Article XXI(6), there is an element of reciprocity under Canadian law in that 
Canadian residents making donations to US charities may receive Canadian tax relief.  
Again, one observes that substance trumps form under this treaty exception as well:  
donations to Canadian charities akin to US charities in terms of their substance or purpose 
will be eligible for US income tax deductions. 
 Mexico 
Similarly, pursuant to Article 22(2) of the US-Mexico Income Tax Treaty,58 a US 
citizen or resident may receive a US income tax deduction for a donation to a Mexican 
                                               
53 Michael W. Galligan, International Charitable Giving and Planning Under U.S. Tax Law, TAX 
MGMT. EST. GIFTS AND TR. J., May-June 2004, at 7, available at http://www.phillipsnizer.com/pdf/Article-
MGIntlLawCharUSTax5-13-04.pdf 
54 Id. (commenting that such trusts may only donate from their “gross income” in contrast to 
individual donors who may donate from income or capital and the absence of percentage limitations on the 
deduction).  
55 Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, Nov. 20, 1975, U.S.-Isr., S. Exec. Doc. No. 94-2. 
56 Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Aug. 16, 1984, U.S.-Can., 1980 
U.S.T. 93.  
57 Galligan, supra note 53, at 7. 
58 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income, Sept. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-7. 
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public charity that is able to receive deductible contributions under Mexican law provided 
that the rules regarding such ability are essentially equivalent to those in the US.  Again, 
under Article 22(3) the element of reciprocity exists under Mexican law in that Mexican 
residents making donations to US public charities may receive income tax deductions.  
Mexican charities “essentially equivalent to” US charities in substance, i.e., having a 
similar charitable purpose, are eligible to receive US income tax deductible contributions.   
In all three cases, one observes that there are restrictions on the amount of the 
deduction.  In some cases, the deduction must be taken against foreign source income.59  
However, the US treaty with Canada does provide that the deduction is not limited to 
Canadian income in certain circumstances. 60 
d. Treaties Not in Force 
While it is unlikely that treaty revision will be the avenue used to eliminate the 
notion of territoriality due to pecuniary costs,61 it is worth considering the historical reasons 
advanced for permitting treaty exceptions to the notion.  The first income tax treaty that 
did away with the notion of territoriality, and therefore permitted a tax deduction for 
donations to a foreign charity, was the United States-Honduras Income Tax Convention,62 
which lapsed in 1966.63  An examination of the treaty exception evinces an approach 
similar to those already discussed.  US taxpayers who made a contribution to a charity 
created in Honduras and operated for purposes akin to those in I.R.C. section 501I(3), i.e., 
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, would receive an income 
tax deduction. 64   However, the deduction was limited to the amount of the donor’s 
Honduras source income. 
If the proposed United States-Brazil Income Tax Convention had been ratified in 
the 1960s, it would have gone even further in the extension of US income tax deductions 
to donations to foreign, i.e., Brazilian charities, that qualified as exempt organizations 
under I.R.C. section 501(c)(3).65  One other condition was that the donations had to be used 
solely in Brazil.66  Assuming those conditions were met, it called for a charitable deduction 
against US source, rather than Brazilian income.67 
In examining current and historic departures from the notion of territoriality, three 
strong arguments in favor of extending tax deductions to donations made to foreign 
charities emerge.  First, if it can be shown that the substance of a foreign charity is akin to 
that of a US charity, a US tax deduction is warranted.  Related to this point is the foreign 
charity’s status under its own country’s laws.  Second, there is a willingness to engage in 
                                               
59 See Nina J. Crimm, Through A Post-September 11 Looking Glass: Assessing the Roles of 
Federal Tax Laws and Tax Policies Applicable to Global Philanthropy by Private Foundations and Their 
Donors, 23 VA. TAX REV. 1, 49 (2003) (noting the deduction may be limited “to a percentage of the donor’s 
income from sources in the foreign country of the charitable donee organization”).   
60 There is an exception in the case of donations made to a Canadian college or university where the 
US donor or his/her family member is or was enrolled.  In such cases, the deductible amount is not limited to 
Canadian income but rather the general limitations that apply under § 170.  No equivalent exception applies 
in the case of Mexican colleges or universities.  See Galligan, supra note 53, at 7–8.  
61 See Crimm, supra note 59, at 49. 
62 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, June 25, 1956, U.S.-Hond., 8 U.S.T. 219. 
63 See Crimm, supra note 59, at 50. 
64 Id.   
65 See id. at 51. 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
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reciprocity.  In other words, presumably the foreign countries have allowed their taxpayers 
to receive a deduction for donations to US charities.  This could have interesting 
implications for the US in terms of additional revenue sources for US charities, which is 
an idea that will be elaborated upon in the second article of this series.  Finally, overall 
relations with other foreign countries are bound to have been affected through such an 
allowance. 
If one considers the drafters’ historical reason for the notion of territoriality, which 
is relief of US governmental burden, at face value, it is not being borne out by the current 
charitable law regime.  Arguably, donations to foreign charities help the US government 
in the same way that donations to US charities that in turn re-donate funds to foreign 
charities do.68  Failure to provide donors with the same US tax benefit, which is merited 
based on the substance of the work the charity is performing as detailed in I.R.C. section 
501(c)(3), leads to a proliferation of charities and inefficiencies.  Allowing donations to 
foreign charities which are in substance the same as US charities could potentially lead to 
additional revenue streams for US charities given the likelihood of reciprocity as well. 
II. WHY THE NOTION OF TERRITORIALITY IS PROBLEMATIC 
The notion of territoriality is problematic not only from an ideological standpoint 
but from a practical standpoint as well.  The next section of this article will address the 
inefficiencies resulting from an over-emphasis on the notion of territoriality in the context 
of the US income tax deduction.  The section will conclude with an analysis of the overall 
effect on international cross-border giving. 
 Practical Standpoint   
A recent Foundation Center Report, prepared in cooperation with the Council on 
Foundations, examined the funding of approximately 1,500 US foundations in 2008 which 
accounted for over four-fifths of total estimated international giving.69  Between 2006 and 
2008, international giving increased more rapidly than overall giving across all foundation 
types.70  Interestingly, even in the wake of an economic crisis, US foundations that fund 
international activities did not waiver substantially in their funding. 71   In 2009, 
international grantmaking, whether in terms of support for US-based international 
programs or cross-border recipients, declined approximately 4 percent in 2009, from a 
record high of $7 billion in 2008 to $6.7 billion.72  When adjusted for inflation, these figures 
reflect an actual decline in the value of international grants of less than 4 percent.  Of 
particular note is the effect of the US’s largest international funder and greatest 
philanthropic grantmaker, the Gates Foundation.  If the Gates Foundation numbers were 
excluded, both overall foundation giving and international funding would have evinced an 
over 9 percent decline.  Perhaps most tellingly, the 2008 survey of international funding 
“did not show a disproportionately large reduction relative to domestic support.”73 
The main problem that the notion of territoriality causes in the area of international 
philanthropy is increased transaction costs.  It is currently possible to receive a US tax 
                                               
68 See Joannie Chang et. al., Cross-Border Charitable Giving, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 563, 569 (1997) 
(citation omitted).  
69 Lawrence & Mukai, supra note 1. 
70 Id. at 2.  
71 Id. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. 
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deduction for a contribution to a foreign charity if one is willing to pay transaction costs.74  
Individual donors desiring a US income tax deduction often end up setting up US charities 
that make grants to foreign charities as a way to circumvent this rule.  As mentioned earlier, 
US charities that re-donate funds to foreign charitable activities still entitle donors to a US 
income tax deduction provided certain safeguards are in place.  This means that US income 
tax deductions are permitted even when a US charity funds a particular foreign charity.  
Such US charities are referred to as “friends of” organizations.75  US charities are either 
classified as “public charities” or “private foundations.”76 Generally, a public charity is one 
that receives donations from a broad section of the public whereas a private foundation is 
typically funded by only a few donors or even one family.77  Relevantly, a US public 
charity may fund not only foreign charities but also non-charitable foreign entities as long 
as such funding is consistent with its own charitable purpose. 78   In contrast, private 
foundations are subject to many more restrictions in terms of use of their funds.  Typically, 
private individuals or families will set up a private foundation because they are not taking 
in donations from a broad section of the public.  Another option is to use a donor-advised 
fund, such as the Charities Aid Foundation;79 however, it is common for extremely high 
net worth individuals to set up their own private foundations. 
Foreign charities also end up setting up “friends of” organizations in the US, which 
typically qualify as US public charities.  The “friends of” organizations then make grants 
to the foreign charities while carefully avoiding running afoul of the anti-conduit rules 
earmarking provisions.80  In Revenue Ruling 66-1979, it was determined that donations to 
a US charity (i.e., a “friends of” organization), that “at times solicits contributions which 
are to be used to provide grants to [a] foreign organization . . . for specific purposes 
approved by [the US charity’s] board of directors” will be eligible for a US income tax 
deduction.81  As long as individual donations82 are made to a US “friends of” organization, 
they are eligible for a US income tax deduction, even if the funds ultimately end up in the 
hands of a foreign charity.  “Friends of” organizations that comply with the requirements 
listed in this 1966 ruling83 are thus a type of intermediary that may be used to circumvent 
the notion of territoriality.   
However, the expense and administration associated with establishing a “friends 
of” organization, whether it is a public charity or a private foundation, detracts from time 
and resources that could otherwise be devoted to worthy international causes.  Dale 
comments that mandating the use of a “friends of” organization in an increasingly global 
philanthropic world leads to unnecessary formalism while curtailing support for causes 
abroad.84  There is some debate among commentators about the ability of a US charitable 
entity known as a “supporting organization” under section 509(a)(3), which has 
                                               
74 Zolt, supra note 16, at 391. 
75 Rev. Rul. 74-229, 1974-1 C.B. 142; Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48. 
76 I.R.C. § 509 (2012).  See also Pozen, supra note 9, at 539. 
77 See Crimm, supra note 59, at 67-68. 
78 See Galligan, supra note 53.  
79 See CAF AMERICA, http://www.cafamerica.org/about/how-we-work/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
80 See Rev. Rul. 71-460, 1971-2 C.B. 231. 
81 Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48. 
82 See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2012) and Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48 (restricting donations by US 
business corporations to only corporate friends of organizations). 
83 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48.  
84 Dale, supra note 18, at 663. 
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overlapping board members with a foreign charity short of control, to be classified as a US 
public charity and thus collect charitable donations eligible for an income tax deduction.85  
However, the “friends of” organization model is accepted and common among global 
philanthropists. 
In terms of putting the requirements into practice, unless it makes a determination 
that the foreign charity is equivalent to a US one, a “friends of” organization that is a private 
foundation must ensure that its re-donation of funds to a foreign charity or foreign 
charitable activity is consistent with its own charitable purpose and exercise some degree 
of supervision (known as “expenditure responsibility”) over the foreign charity’s use of the 
funds.86  These requirements add considerably to the time and expense required to engage 
in international grantmaking.  A “friends of” organization may need to undertake certain 
operational procedures such as written grant proposals and extensive monitoring of funds.87 
 Ideological Standpoint 
While difficulties associated with the notion of territoriality may keep lawyers well 
fed in hours, they do little to help feed the poor or marginalized around the world.  
According to the Global Poverty Project, a UK based charity, over 1.4 billion people 
currently live on less than $1.25 per day.88  The foundation of what “charitable” means in 
the US is based upon “Christian ideals, Roman precedents, and Common Law” that shaped 
the conception of law in medieval England.89  Charity, or “philanthropy” as defined in 
scripture, “is an intensely personal commitment to following the example of Christ by 
healing the sick, feeding the poor, and helping the helpless.”90  These goals were embodied 
in the definition of “charitable” in England’s Statute of Uses, which served as the basis for 
the equivalent provision in the US or I.R.C. section 501(c)(3).  US charitable law should 
not restrict the ability of individuals to spend their resources and time embracing these 
goals.  The right to love one’s neighbor as one’s self must be embodied in our notion of a 
right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and surely that notion should remain more 
pronounced than an ill-conceived notion of territoriality. 
Requiring individual philanthropists and groups of philanthropists to spend their 
resources on complying with formality instead of the substance of fulfilling needs is at 
odds with the concept of charity.  Tax scholar Nina Crimm impugns the US government to 
“develop a global philanthropic policy that encourages greater financial participation by 
America’s citizens, corporations, and nonprofit organizations.”91  US charitable law should 
promote rather than provide costly obstacles to such philanthropic-minded individuals.  
The precautions underlying the present system may be met through other reporting 
mechanisms that could be deemed mandatory for foreign charities. 
At the same time, one may argue that there is an underlying US policy to make 
donating to international causes more difficult, which is founded upon the desire to steer 
                                               
85 See Galligan, supra note 53.  
86 See Dale, supra note 18, at 663, 685 (noting the requirements for expenditure responsibility and 
the foreign equivalency test). 
87 See Crimm, supra note 59, at 83, 86. 
88 See 1.4 Billion Reasons – The Presentation, THE GLOBAL POVERTY PROJECT (last visited Nov. 10, 
2013), http://www.globalpovertyproject.com/pages/presentation. 
89 Peter Dobkin Hall, The Statute of Charitable Uses and the English Origins of American Philanth 
ropy, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/phall/01.%20Charitable%20uses.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2013). 
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91 Crimm, supra note 9, at 1. 
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donor giving to domestic causes.  In fact, as pointed out earlier, the notion of territoriality 
has long been associated with an isolationist foreign policy that was prevalent in the 
aftermath of the Depression Era.92  Certainly, the rules regarding in-kind donations to 
private foundations are geared toward making cross-border giving more difficult. 93  
However, if that were the overall aim of US rules, again, one would wonder why the US 
permits a US charity to carry out its purposes solely abroad or to re-donate funds to foreign 
charities.  As Pozen states, “our tax system privileges domestic altruism over international 
altruism, but incompletely.”94 The inconsistency argument outlined in section I persists.  
Moreover, in terms of situating donations to international causes in a theory of why the 
charitable deduction exists, one may conclude that “internationally-targeted contributions 
. . . are more altruistic than domestic-targeted contributions.” 95   As Pozen declares, 
international giving provides a way for US citizens to own up to their responsibilities to 
the world in a way that foreign aid by the US does not.96  With that consideration in mind, 
along with the push for consistency in terms of tax law, the path to cross-border giving 
should be less arduous. 
 Implementation Issues  
The full framework of implementation is beyond the scope of this article, but it is 
an issue that merits careful attention.  Zolt argues that the strongest reason for requiring 
use of a US charity is “to increase accountability and transparency.”97  At the same time, it 
has been argued that the body responsible for charitable oversight in the UK, the Charity 
Commission, provides better monitoring than the IRS. 98   Provided a feasible 
implementation method can be constructed, revision is necessary if the major global ills of 
today are to be remedied. 
Implementation and oversight issues associated with less priority being afforded 
to the notion of territoriality in US charitable law raise important concerns.  An 
implementation strategy that takes into account the concern over charitable funds being 
used to support terrorist activity is crucial.  After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, 
two mechanisms were put into place to ensure charitable funds are not used to promote 
terrorist activities:  (1) Executive Order 13224 and (2) the USA Patriot Act.99  The former, 
among other restrictions, makes it illegal for any US person to engage in a transaction with 
individuals and organizations named on any terrorism watch lists of the US government.100  
The latter increased the purview of criminal prohibitions related to supporting terrorist 
                                               
92 See Lieber, supra note 36, at 741. 
93 See Jones, supra note51, at 119 (exploring the restriction on gifts of appreciated property to 
private foundations in the context of cross-border giving); see also Pozen, supra note 9, at 541 (commenting 
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96 See id. at 592. 
97 Zolt, supra note 16, at 392. 
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activities and strengthened the penalties for noncompliance.101  In addition, it serves as a 
mechanism to ensure US non-citizen residents who engage in such charitable giving will 
incur deleterious immigration effects.102   
1. Looking to Prior Solutions 
In addition, in 2002, the Treasury Department released the Anti-Terrorist 
Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for US-Based Charities (“Guidelines”), 
which as the name suggests, are not compulsory.103  These Guidelines were received as 
“unworkable, marginally related to the diversion of charitable assets, and very likely to 
discourage international charitable involvement by US organizations.”104  Two of the most 
glaring problems with the Guidelines were that they did not consider existing laws 
applicable to foreign grants or US grantmaker experience with making foreign grants.   
The most effective solution in a cross-border context will likely only come from 
the efforts of US grantmakers who have dealt extensively with foreign charities.  In 
response to the Guidelines, approximately thirty organizations (ranging from private 
foundations, public charities, and religious organizations to the Council on Foundations 
and Grantmakers Without Borders) convened a working group to construct “Principles of 
International Charity” (“the Principles”).105   
Collectively, this group represented thousands of organizations and compiled the 
Principles after seven months of drafting and an additional year of discussions.106  The 
Principles could be applied to any foreign charity eligible to collect deductible donations 
from US donors.107  Again, the onus would fall on US donors to show that a given foreign 
charity satisfies the requirements.  Most relevantly for implementation, the Principles 
provided the following:108 
 Charitable organizations must only carry out the charitable purposes for which they 
were formed.  
 Charitable organizations must meet the charitable law standards of the US and the 
relevant laws of foreign jurisdictions in which they are carrying out their charitable 
purposes. 
 A charitable organization’s compliance with relevant laws is the province of the 
board of directors. 
 Charitable organizations must ensure that appropriate steps are taken to ensure that 
their assets are used only for charitable purposes through the use of financial 
controls.  
The Principles are a landmark example of charities collaborating to set up 
procedural safeguards against the use of charitable assets for terrorist activity.  Some 
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102 8 U.S.C. §§1182(a)(3) (2012) (authorizing the exclusion of any person who is part of, or 
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103 Sharon P. Light, The Principles of International Charity: An Effective Alternative to the 
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UK implementation of the case evinces.  See Persche, supra note 6. 
108 See Light, supra note 103, at 3.  
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Treasury Department officials have expressed support for the Principles.109  In terms of 
revision of the Principles, the main Treasury Department critique seems to involve the lack 
of a use of existing “lists of suspected or known supporters of terrorism.”110  An additional 
requirement regarding use of such lists could easily be added.  
Already there have been proposals to place responsibility with US charities for 
ensuring charitable funds do not end up as terrorist financing.111  These same safeguards 
may be applied to a limited number of foreign charities allowed to receive deductible 
donations.  Even if an alternative implementation strategy based upon the Principles is not 
approved, applying the Treasury Department’s Guidelines to foreign charities seeking to 
register with the US would provide another viable option.  Although there has been some 
criticism that the Guidelines shift governmental responsibilities, e.g., the gathering of 
intelligence, to US charitable organizations, or in the context discussed here, to US donors, 
they may still provide a framework for securing information about foreign charities that 
would satisfy possible inquiries about charitable activity abroad involving terrorist 
financing.112 
2.  IRS Approved Lists 
In addition to creating US “friends of” organizations, US donors desiring to make 
donations to foreign charities have used what are known as US donor-advised funds; an 
observation of proposed regulation of grants from such funds to foreign organizations 
provides insight regarding implementation.  Currently, private foundations make grants to 
donor-advised funds run by public charities that either have offices or affiliates in various 
countries, e.g., Give2Asia, United Way International, and Charities Aid Foundation 
America.113  A donor-advised fund allows a donor to give up the legal right to select the 
ultimate recipient of his/her charitable donation but permits such donor to advise the public 
charity that runs the fund of his/her requested use of the donation.114  For example, a donor 
may make a donation to a public charity and advise (but not insist) that it be used to fund 
a specific foreign charitable organization.  The IRS may determine that the foreign charities 
associated with these US public charities meet certain requirements (discussed later), and 
there is no need for the intermediary.  Such foreign charities could also be subject to 
reporting requirements, akin to those applicable to US charities, once on an IRS approved 
list.  As one commentator has noted, the US charities that are familiar with the target 
country that is the subject of charitable activity will be the most effective reporters. 115  
Clearly, it follows that a foreign organization would be able to provide even more salient 
and accurate information to the IRS.  
In 2004, a proposal was made to the Senate Finance Committee to allow US donor-
advised funds to make grants only to foreign organizations that are included on the IRS’s 
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113 Donor-Advised Funds and International Grantmaking: Council on Foundations Position on 
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list of approved funds.116  Notably, the Council on Foundations challenged this proposal.  
The mere fact that it was suggested that the IRS could maintain a list of “approved foreign 
organizations” suggests that there is a viable option of having the IRS examine at least 
well-known foreign charities and determine whether they meet certain standards discussed 
later in the next section.117  Granted, administrative concerns are a factor; however, one 
must consider that the IRS ultimately would consider far fewer US “friends of” applications 
and thus have additional time to turn to documentation of foreign organizations, which a 
donor would be required to submit before securing a deduction.  The next section discusses 
how the European Union has addressed the implementation issue; findings from the ECJ 
may provide additional insight into a US implementation strategy.  
III. EUROPEAN MODEL 
 Persche – The Impetus for Change in the UK & other EU Member States 
The current US position on donations to foreign charities is not the only feasible 
approach as an examination of the laws of the UK and certain other EU member states 
evinces.  Europe offers a model that addresses the above-mentioned implementation issues 
that the US could emulate.  The main impetus for change in the UK (and other EU member 
states) was a case brought before the ECJ in 2006, Persche v. Finanzamt Ludenscheid.118  
There have been numerous comments on this decision and various reactions among EU 
member states.  Not every EU member state has decided to amend its laws.  The UK is an 
example of a member state that has taken its time but ultimately embraced the decision.  
The Netherlands provides an example of one that initially afforded less weight to the notion 
of territoriality but oddly has refused to conform to Persche.  Nevertheless, the UK model 
and the un-revised Dutch model are instructive to the US in considering lessening the 
weight given to the notion in its charitable laws governing international giving. 
In Persche, the ECJ launched a dramatic attack against the notion of territoriality 
as a prevailing concept among the charitable laws of EU member states.  Persche dealt 
with a German citizen’s donation of goods (including, inter alia, bed linen, towels, and 
children’s toys) to a Portuguese charitable retirement and children’s home.  Germany 
denied the in-kind donation on the grounds that it was not made to a charity formed in 
Germany, i.e., based on the notion of territoriality.119  The German tax authorities denied 
the deduction simply because the home was not formed in Germany.  The ECJ held that (i) 
where a donor claims a tax deduction for a gift made to a non-indigenous charity (“EU 
charity”), freedom of capital provisions are implicated and (ii) freedom of capital 
provisions prevent EU member states from legislating that only gifts made to indigenous 
charities may be deducted without providing an opportunity for a donor to demonstrate that 
a gift to a EU charity satisfies his/her home State law requirements for a tax deduction.120  
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In sum, the Persche case is a response to the assumption that the notion of territoriality 
prevents donors from making cross-border donations.121 
A significant case in the area of cross-border charitable giving that the Persche 
court relied upon in its analysis was Centro di Musicologica Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt 
M Nchen fr Krperschaften122.  Stauffer provides several sound rationales that should be 
instructive to the US in deciding to comply with Persche or to adopt a similar approach in 
the area of cross-border giving.  Stauffer dealt with an Italian charity resident in Munich, 
Germany that funded scholarships for prospective Swiss persons in Bern, Switzerland to 
study classical musical in Cremona, Italy.123  Specifically, the Persche court cited Stauffer 
for the proposition that an EU member state may require a foreign charity to provide 
information, e.g., annual accounts and activity reports prior to granting such an entity tax 
exemption.124  It also relied upon Stauffer to argue that tax benefits associated with a 
foreign charity carrying out activity in a given member state should not be limited under 
good policy.125  Even though the Italian charity did not directly benefit German citizens, 
since it also included general education of the history of music as one of its charitable 
activities, it was deemed to have the possibility of indirectly benefitting Germany and thus 
Germany’s denial of its ability to take in tax deductible donations was seen as improper.126  
In addition, the Stauffer court stated that if Germany had decided to grant tax 
benefits to German charities carrying out charitable activity, it should not be able to deny 
the same benefits to Italian ones because, after all, it was free not to extend tax benefits to 
any charity, whether domestic or foreign. 127   Since German law did not restrict such 
benefits to only those German charities that provided a public benefit to its citizens, it could 
not impose such a restriction upon non-German charities.  Although Persche has resulted 
in precedent for curbing the notion of territoriality, and subsequent amendments to the EU 
Treaty have reflected the same, it still remains the province of the member states to decide 
whether they will extend tax benefits to each of the EU member states.   
The solution Persche proposes for EU member states involves a two-part inquiry.  
The first question is whether the EU charity would be recognized as charitable under the 
law of the Member State in which it is formed.128  The second question is whether it would 
be recognized as such under the donor’s home state charitable law.129  To summarize, a 
donor would be able to receive a tax deduction for a gift made to an EU charity if, and only 
if, such a charity would be recognized as one under the law of the state in which the 
deduction is sought and under the charitable law associated with the home state where it 
was formed.130  Regarding the second prong, although there has been some debate about 
                                               
121 Id.; see also Case C-318/07, Hein Persche v. Finanzamt Ludenscheid, 2009 E.C.R. I-359, paras. 
47, 38.  
122 Case C-386/04, Centro di Musicologia, 2006 E.C.R. I-8203. 
123 See id. at para. 9; see also Charles R. Ostertag, We're Starting to Share Well with Others: Cross-
Border Giving Lessons from the Court of Justice of the European Union, 20 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 255, 
269 (2011).  
124 See Ostertag, supra note 123, at 265.  
125 Id. at 268. 
126 See Case C-386/04, Centro di Musicologia, 2006 E.C.R. I-8203. 
127 See Case C-318/07, Persche, 2009 E.C.R. I-359, para. 44.  
128 Id. at paras. 49, 63; see also Simpson, supra note 119. 
129 Case C-318/07, Persche, 2009 E.C.R. I-359.  
130 Id. 
88 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.5:69 
 
whether the standard the foreign charity must meet is “likely,” the ECJ’s decision expresses 
that the test is absolute.131 
Interestingly, the ruling does not mean that donations of goods or other non-cash 
assets to a foreign charity would result in an income tax deduction where the donor’s home 
state legislation does not allow for a deduction in such instances.132  Moreover, the decision 
does not apply to donations of services (since such services do not fall within the ambit of 
free movement of capital under Article 56 of the European Community (“EC”) Treaty).133  
At the same time, it could be argued that a donation of services, which does not result in a 
deduction under US law, implicates freedom to provide services under Article 49 of the 
EC Treaty.134   
Another issue of contention has been that of evidence which, according to the 
Persche case, the donor’s home state may require him/her to bear.135  (As stated earlier, 
this would prove most administrable in terms of US implementation as well.)  In other 
words, the donor’s home state may demand that he/she offer evidence to show that the 
foreign charity satisfies the requirements of the Persche test.136  To establish the charitable 
status of an EU charity under the relevant member state law and the donor’s home state 
law, a donor may be required to provide, inter alia, the following: “a certificate of 
establishment, its constitution, annual reports and accounts, and any certificate of 
charitable status issued by its own member state.” 137   Where a donor has provided 
insufficient evidence to make such a showing, the ECJ determined that it is up to each 
home state to decide the adequacy of information, submitted on a case-by-case basis, and 
whether the home state should send a request to the charity’s member state under the “tax 
information exchange directive” (“Directive”).138  Thus, the donor’s home state may deny 
a tax deduction but should take into account the extent to which the taxpayer has attempted 
to secure the required information.  If it appears the donor’s efforts were adequate, such 
home state should use the procedures set forth in the Directive to secure the missing 
information prior to denying a deduction.139   
Using the UK as an example, a UK donor should request all relevant evidence from 
the EU charity and provide it to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”), along 
with a copy of his or her request, at the time of seeking a deduction.  HMRC would make 
a determination of whether the information was adequate, and if not, whether the taxpayer 
made a diligent effort to obtain all necessary information.  If such an effort is found, HMRC 
would ask the charity’s member state for assistance with obtaining additional information 
under the Directive.  If HMRC still does not have adequate information, it may refuse the 
donor’s request for a deduction.  The UK’s current rules reflect this framework in a more 
detailed manner as described in the next section. 
The ECJ could have more strongly attacked the notion of territoriality.  It only 
answered the German court that a donor must be provided with the opportunity to show 
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evidence that his or her gift qualifies for a tax deduction.140  It did not define what type of 
opportunity must be granted.141  
In contrast, an issue does remain regarding whether the donor’s home state must 
deem sufficient a declaration by a charity formed in another member state that it is 
charitable under the donor’s home state’s charitable law.142  In the case of the UK, for 
example, if HMRC may rely only on a declaration of an EU charity, suspicions will 
inevitably result.143  Fortunately, the requirement that such an EU charity also show that it 
meets the definition of a charity under UK law now circumvents the problem of placing 
sole weight on a declaration.144 
Another issue that the ECJ does not cover in Persche is whether a donation made 
to the branch or agency of a charity “established” in a member state still entitles the donor 
to a tax deduction.145  An “establishment” includes branches and agencies.146  European 
law allows a charity incorporated outside the EU to qualify as a branch or agent.147  In 
contrast, “established” in terms of US charitable law means “created in or organized under 
the laws of the US.”148  If a charity has been incorporated outside the EU and has a branch 
or agency in the EU that has been recognized as charitable, a deduction to such branch or 
agency may result in a tax deduction.149  Some have posited that the Persche decision 
prevents the result of having a charity formed in a non-EU member state collect tax-
deductible donations through an EU member branch or agency by including the 
Directive. 150   Arguably, since such third party countries would not be subject to the 
Directive, donations to their branches or agencies would not be tax deductible.151   
 Drawbacks of Persche 
In terms of a UK donor, there will be some inconvenience given that the 
declaration required from the EU charity may not be readily available.152  It is common for 
UK charities to have a gift aid declaration form (explained below) that is provided to donors 
to ensure them that their donation will result in a UK tax deduction.153  Under EU law, if a 
requirement renders the obtaining of a tax deduction “virtually impossible or excessively 
difficult,” it may be held unlawful; however, it is clear that the declaration requirement 
would not fall into either of these categories.154   
In terms of practicalities, the ECJ did not find that the difficulties posed by a 
requirement of providing sufficient information that an EU charity in fact was established 
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and operated as a charity justified retaining the notion of territoriality (which, as stated 
earlier, was deemed to be in clear violation of freedom of movement of capital).155  One 
UK practitioner noted that after Persche, an EU charity could be required to submit 
documents (with English translations) showing the following: its home state has 
recognized it as charitable; it has carried out relevant purposes; and it would be a charity if 
formed under UK law.156  Interestingly, that is exactly what the UK has decided to adopt.157 
The overall effect of Persche on UK cross-border giving is complicated by the 
UK’s proposed adoption (and subsequent abandonment) of a cap on charitable giving in 
the wake of implementation.158  At the same time, it is clear that a small number of wealthy 
donors have used off-shore, i.e., non-UK, charities for personal gain.159  However, tax 
authorities largely view this behavior as easily recognizable, which suggests abuse is not 
rampant. 160   The European Foundation Center and Transnational Giving Europe are 
presently collaborating on a report that will trace the major developments in EU charitable 
giving since Persche.161  The report is scheduled for release during the later portion of 
2013.162   The findings, along with recent questioning of the IRS’s ability to monitor 
charities,163 will be examined in the context of the second article in this series as instructive 
guidance for an implementation framework for the US.  
I.V. UK MODEL - NEW NOTIONS IN LIGHT OF PERSCHE 
The UK provides an example of a country that recently has abandoned the notion 
of territoriality to a large extent in terms of granting tax deductions for donations to certain 
foreign charities, and this example may be instructive to the US.  As explained, the main 
reason for the UK’s near abandonment of the notion was Persche.  After considering the 
history of the notion of territoriality in UK laws, an examination of the UK’s current 
charitable law in regard to cross-border giving (in light of Persche) will be discussed.   
 UK - History of Territoriality 
The notion of territoriality was firmly affixed in UK charitable law in 1956 in the 
decision of Camille and Henry Dreyfus Foundation, Inc. v. Inland Revenue 
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Commissioners.164  This case dealt with section 37(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act of 1918.  
Thus, charitable donations were only subject to tax relief (most notably, tax deductions) 
when they were made to a charity formed in the UK.165  In other words, for purposes of 
income tax, capital gains tax, and the UK’s equivalent of the US estate tax (“inheritance 
tax”), the term “charities” refers to only those formed in the UK.166  Although capital gains 
tax legislation does not expressly include the notion, HMRC has applied the notion in both 
the income tax and capital gains tax contexts. 167   In terms of legislation regarding 
inheritance tax, HMRC has applied the case-law meaning of “charity.”168  In sum, the UK’s 
adoption of the notion of territoriality means that historically donations made to charities 
formed in other EU member states (“EU charities”) and to US charities have not resulted 
in tax deductions.   
Perhaps the most striking objection to the adoption of the notion of territoriality in 
the UK was that it conflicted with European law.169  Well-regarded UK tax practitioners 
and scholars, Kessler and Kamal, have noted this tension.170  In addressing this issue in 
2006, the European Commission informed the UK about the unfair results arising from its 
embrace of the notion of territoriality.171  Specifically, the European Commission sent an 
opinion to the UK prior to Persche.172  Although the change was not sudden, the UK has 
amended its law since the European Commission clarified and emphasized its position in 
Persche.173 
 Current UK Law 
The US may benefit from an understanding of how the Persche case informed a 
change in the UK in considering whether to move away from the notion of territoriality.  
The Persche decision takes opposition with the argument in the UK that UK and EU 
charities are not comparable because different charitable tests of benevolence apply.174  The 
test adopted in Persche would require that a foreign charity meet the requirements of a UK 
charity before a donation to it would result in a tax deduction.175   
The UK made a dramatic stride in weakening the grip of the notion of territoriality 
by adopting a new definition of charity under the Finance Act 2010 (“the Finance Act”) 
that results in applying UK tax reliefs to certain charities and other organizations 
(“charities”) in the EU, Norway, and Iceland (“European charities”), specifically those that 
are determined to be equivalent to UK charities (or Community Amateur Sports Clubs).176  
To be eligible to take in deductible donations, these charities must meet the new definition 
of charity under the Finance Act, which includes the following requirements, as explained 
in more detail and in their statutory context in the next section:  
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(1) Be able to show that if they were based in the UK, they would be considered 
a charity, i.e., have a charitable purpose under the Charities Act of 2011; 
(2) Be formed in an EU Member State, Iceland, or Norway; 
(3) Be registered by the equivalent of the tax charity regulator (i.e., the equivalent 
of the UK’s “Charity Commission”) if required under its country’s laws; and 
(4) Be managed by "fit and proper persons."177 
Under Schedule 6 of the Finance Act, “charity”178 means “a body of persons or 
trust that—(a) is established for charitable purposes only, (b) meets the jurisdiction 
condition (see paragraph 2), (c) meets the registration condition (see paragraph 3), and (d) 
meets the management condition (see paragraph 4).”179  Given an examination of (a) and 
(b) above, it is clear the notion of territoriality now plays less of a role in terms of what 
constitutes a charity.  Under the Finance Act of 2010, a non-UK charity may also be 
considered to have been “established for a charitable purpose” provided its purpose meets 
the definition set forth in the most recent Charities Act, which currently is the Charities 
Act of 2011.180  (Also, the charity must be required under its “governing document to us[e] 
all of its income and assets for its stated charitable purposes.”)181 
However, there is still a jurisdictional (albeit much less restrictive) overlay 
provided with paragraph 2.  Paragraph 2(1) provides the following:   
A body of persons or trust meets the jurisdiction condition if it [is] subject 
to the control of—(a) a relevant UK court in the exercise of its jurisdiction 
with respect to charities, or (b) any other court in the exercise of a 
corresponding jurisdiction under the law of a relevant territory.182 
As a result, under 2(b), the UK charitable law has decreased the role of the notion 
of territoriality but has not abandoned it, and therefore, it strikes an acceptable balance.  If 
a non-UK charity is subject to the courts of certain “relevant territories,” defined in sub-
paragraph 3 as “(a) a member State other than the United Kingdom, or (b) a territory 
specified in regulations made by the Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and 
Customs,”183 it may take in tax deductible donations.  Norway and Iceland were added to 
the list of “relevant territories” in paragraph 2(3) by related regulations.184  As HMRC notes 
on its site, the jurisdiction condition is satisfied by a European charity when it is subject to 
the control of a court with a jurisdiction corresponding to that required for UK charities, 
i.e., for purposes of the UK High Court, the Court of Session in Scotland, or the High Court 
in Northern Ireland.185 
                                               
177 See Chapter 2 - Applications for recognition as a charity for tax purposes, supra note 157.  
178 There have been further changes regarding the definition of charity for purpose of charities that 
do not collect gift aid, which are not the focus of this article. 
179 Finance Act, 2010, c. 13, § 1, sch. 6 (U.K.). 
180 Id.  (“For the meaning of “charitable purpose,” see section 2 of the Charities Act [2011], 
which—(a) applies regardless of where the body of persons or trust in question is established, and (b) for this 
purpose forms part of the law of each part of the United Kingdom . . . .”).  See  Charities Act 2011, c. 25, § 2 
(U.K.). 
181 Chapter 2 - Applications for recognition as a charity for tax purposes, supra note 157, at § 2.4. 
182 Finance Act, 2010, c. 13, § 1, sch. 6 (U.K.).  
183 See Finance Act, 2010, c. 13, § 2, sch. 6 (U.K.). 
184 See Explanatory note to the Finance Act, 2010, c. 13, sch. 6 (U.K.), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/1904/note/made. 
185 See Chapter 2 - Applications for recognition as a charity for tax purposes, supra note 157.  
2013] THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION GAMES:  93 





In terms of the last two requirements, a European charity meets the “registration 
condition” if under the law of the country where it is established (“home State”), it is 
required to be registered, and it is so registered.186  The “management condition” may be 
met through satisfaction of the “fit and proper persons” test by those who have control and 
management of the charity.187  At the same time that the UK has embraced a broader 
concept of charity that includes certain foreign charities, interestingly, as noted earlier, it 
has toyed with the idea of adopting an income tax relief cap that affects both charitable 
deductions and on-charitable deductions.188  UK citizens have successfully avoided that 
result.189 
 If the UK Did it, the US Should 
The nature of how charitable donations result in a tax deduction for donors, and 
uniquely an additional amount for the charity by the UK taxing authority (HMRC) 
underscores the viability for a similar result in terms of the US.  If the UK, with its more 
complex mechanisms for handling tax relief was able to change its laws for the greater 
good, the US should be able to do the same.  An examination of the complexities of the 
UK’s implementation issues, which do not apply to and thus strengthen the argument in 
favor for US implementation, follows. 
In the UK, for a donation to entitle a donor to income tax relief, it must be cash 
and be made to a charity “established for charitable purposes.”190  Under the UK’s revised 
law, a foreign charity may be deemed so “established.”  Tax relief is available for gifts of 
shares, securities, and land;191 however, this article is concerned with income tax relief 
available and therefore the analysis will be confined to cash donations.  When a donor in 
the UK makes a donation, the “Gift Aid” provisions result in tax relief in a manner that 
differs from that used in the US and that adds a few extra levels of complexity.  First, 
donors are deemed to have given an additional amount equal to the amount of “basic rate” 
tax on the gift.192  In other words, HMRC assumes that the donor meant to give the donated 
amount, plus any basic rate income tax that was paid on the amount.  The recipient charity 
reclaims this amount from HMRC.193  “Higher rate taxpayers,” 40% rate taxpayers, are 
entitled to a tax deduction on their gift (“UK tax deduction.”).194  For the April 2013 tax 
year, the higher rate taxpayer threshold has been reduced from £42,475 to £41,450.195 
The UK tax relief system poses a number of complications and arguments against 
a leaning away from the notion of territoriality, which fortunately the US system does not 
embody.  HMRC requires that gift aid declarations include a statement that the donor has 
paid enough income and capital gains tax to cover the basic rate of tax on the gift which is 
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grossed up.196  Arguably, donors may not be aware of such a requirement when dealing 
with an EU charity and not make this requisite representation associated with Gift Aid 
Declarations to HMRC.  As a result, donors to an EU charity would probably need to make 
a separate Gift Aid declaration, stating that they had paid the requisite amount of income 
tax to HMRC.  The way Gift Aid functions (with HMRC paying an additional amount to 
the charity in question) may cause some administrative burdens and complications with 
currency exchanges, but as one practitioner has noted, and the UK tax authorities 
subsequently agreed, these are not insurmountable obstacles.197  Even if one thinks HMRC 
should not be required to pay over the gross up amount to a foreign charity, it should be a 
foregone conclusion that the donor in this instance is entitled to a tax deduction although 
that was more than likely a topic of debate.198  Also, it is worth noting that there will be 
numerous times when a foreign charity will not know to claim an additional amount from 
HMRC, which will result in a windfall for HMRC.199  As one practitioner has noted, that a 
foreign charity must apply to HMRC to obtain the additional amount owed, will ensure 
that the administrative burden on HMRC is kept at a level similar to that for UK formed 
charities.200 
Given that the UK ultimately decided to embrace the approach of Persche and 
allow tax-deductible donations to be made to foreign charities, it is entirely feasible for the 
US to do the same.  The UK system is vastly more complex in terms of providing relief in 
this area, yet it still managed to adapt to this change and to design an effective means of 
implementation.  The US system would not have as many administrative costs associated 
with implementation or pose as great of a burden on donors. 
V. THE NETHERLANDS – STARTING EARLY BUT FINISHING LATE IN 
THE CROSS-BORDER GAME 
 Current Law in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands’ charitable law began to turn away from the notion of territoriality 
early in the 20th century.  However, the Netherlands has lagged behind other EU member 
states in making the leap required under Persche.  Since the notion of territoriality has been 
embodied in its charitable laws, an examination is warranted in considering a possible 
change for the US. 
Much like for a US donor, in order for a Dutch resident donor to receive an income 
tax deduction, his/her contribution must be made to a resident philanthropic organization 
(“a Dutch charity”) as defined in Art. 6.33 of the Income Tax Act ((“ITA”).201  The notion 
of territoriality has been firmly established in the definition of a Dutch charity since the 
term was formulated.202  The definition of a Dutch charity was originally provided for in 
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the Gift and Inheritance Tax Act of 1956.  It is defined as “an organization resident in the 
Netherlands or in the overseas territories of the Netherlands, the pursuits of which [are] 
addressed to the Dutch territory.”203  The requirement that the charitable purpose be carried 
out in the Netherlands was later abandoned204 resulting in a closer similarity to the law in 
the US and the UK.  As Dutch charity expert Ineke Koele points out, Dutch resident donors 
typically do not receive deductions for donations to non-Dutch charities.205  
The reason that has been evidenced in the Netherlands regarding the existence of 
the notion of territoriality is “the need for effective control regarding the operational test 
of the recipient organization."206  In order to be considered formed in the Netherlands, the 
organization must be incorporated under Dutch civil law and meet associated procedural 
requirements (e.g., notarial deed).  However, if the charity is managed outside of the 
Netherlands, it will not be considered a Dutch charity and therefore cannot take in 
deductible donations from Dutch resident donors.207 
It is important to note a distinction between types of gifts under Dutch charitable 
law.  The ITA addresses two categories of gifts: (1) one-time gifts and (2) “periodic 
gifts.”208  For purposes of this article, the former will be addressed.209  A one-time gift is 
deductible to the extent it (aggregated with other gifts by the donor) exceeds a minimum 
threshold (1% of taxable gross income) and the total one-time gifts of the donor does not 
exceed a maximum threshold (10% of taxable gross income before personal deductions).210 
Unfortunately, the same inefficiencies discussed in regard to the US, and formerly 
the UK, result in the Netherlands because of its territoriality system.  A non-resident 
founder must form a Dutch charity even if the charitable activity proposed is carried out 
completely outside of the Netherlands. 211   If it is discovered that a Dutch charity is 
supporting violence or if it subverts Dutch public polices, it will no longer be considered 
to meet the definition of charity provided for in the ITA.212   
 Request for Change 
Although the Netherlands’ system for determining when to allow Dutch donors’ 
donations to foreign organizations to result in a tax deduction is likely to change given the 
EU Commission’s requests in light of Persche, its current system, which already affords 
less primacy to the notion of territoriality, may prove instructive for determining a system 
of compliance and enforcement that may be useful for the US.  From 1990, the ITA and 
the Corporate Income Tax Act (“CITA”) have given the Ministry of Finance the authority 
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to name foreign qualifying charities as able to receive tax deductible donations from Dutch 
residents.213  Essentially, there are three types of foreign qualifying charities under the 
Dutch regime, those which (1) increase their reach and charitable activity to the 
Netherlands and meet the requirements of a Dutch charity (e.g., European political parties), 
(2) increase their reach and charitable activity not just to the Netherlands but globally (e.g., 
environmental charities), and (3) carry out a charitable purpose in their home country that 
a Dutch charity does but only if the donor resides there (and is considered a Dutch resident 
by one of two specified standards).214  Depending upon which category the foreign charity 
falls into from above, the information it is required to submit to Dutch tax authorities will 
vary.  In both scenarios (1) and (2), the foreign charity must offer evidence that allows the 
Dutch tax authorities to assess its charitable nature and a sufficient connection to the 
Netherlands.  However, in scenario (2), the foreign charity must submit the following 
additional information: (1) a declaration from its home state tax authorities, (2) 
organizational documents, (3) a description of its charitable activities; and (4) yearly 
spending and income.215  If the foreign charity has a Dutch establishment, it will not be 
considered “qualifying.” 216   “Foreign Affairs” taxing authorities determine whether a 
foreign charity is “qualifying.”  This body maintains a list that is regularly published, and 
as of the date of Koele’s book, there were around 22 foreign charities listed, most of which 
are well-known: UNHCR, INSEAD, etc.217 
The reason advanced in Dutch parliament for only allowing a limited exception to 
the notion of territoriality, where the charitable purpose either directly involves the 
Netherlands as in scenario (1) or indirectly as in scenario (2), is that it would be too difficult 
to determine whether the operational test was met if there were no requirement of a Dutch 
connection. 218   The parliament determined that foreign charities without a tie to the 
Netherlands would be too difficult to monitor.219  As Koele points out, “[I]t can be said that 
the Dutch policy is aimed at a narrow and discretionary resolution of the landlock in 
situations where the Dutch public interest is (partly) directly or indirectly served by the 
activities of a foreign philanthropic organization; the argument of a lack of control is 
apparently overcome in these situations.”220  This thinking is evident in the requirement 
that foreign charities with an indirect Dutch purpose must provide “more information to 
Dutch tax authorities.”221 
 Historical Reasons for the Notion in the Netherlands 
The history of the limited exception to the notion of territoriality is insightful.  The 
extension of the ability to take in deductible donations to certain foreign charities in 1990 
sparked debate between parliamentary members and the Secretary of State.222  Some of the 
former argued that the extension should not be granted to foreign charities that do not have 
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Dutch-specific interests.223  However, the Secretary of State noted that Dutch charities that 
carry out their charitable activity wholly abroad may still receive tax deductible donations 
under existing law: “[I]t is not required that a deductible gift indirectly serve a Dutch 
purpose, as under current law, gifts to domestic philanthropic organizations may be used 
by the latter for entirely foreign causes.”224  The Secretary of State also addressed the Dutch 
position in the context of larger European Union views about cross-border giving and noted 
that generally gifts to foreign charities are not eligible for a tax deduction in the home State 
of the donor, but did not address whether this was a violation of the EC Treaty, which of 
course the ECJ later decided it was in Persche.225  In 2006, a bill was introduced that would 
allow for a greater expansion to the number of foreign charities that would be able to 
receive tax-deductible donations from Dutch resident donors.226  The motivation for this 
change was that the Dutch government did not think the rationale advanced for treating 
foreign charities differently would be acceptable to a challenge of a violation of freedom 
of movement of capital as was held in Persche. 227  As explained below, this was an 
insufficient step. 
 Falling Behind the Giving Times 
Unfortunately, the Netherlands has fallen behind in terms of opening up its borders 
in light of Persche.  In 2011, the European Commission decided to bring the Netherlands 
before the ECJ after it failed to offer Dutch donors a chance to submit evidence that a 
donation to a foreign charity qualifies for a deduction, which now is a violation of the EU 
restriction against impeding free movement of capital after Persche. 228   As explained 
above, Dutch tax deductions are available only for charities that are registered in the 
Netherlands.229  While foreign charities may be registered, the registration requirement 
discourages Dutch donors from making gifts to foreign charities and does not provide them 
with an opportunity to show that the gift to a non-registered foreign charity is deductible 
as required under Persche.230   
As it currently stands, the Dutch charitable law on this point violates EU rules on 
the free movement of capital under Article 63 of the EU and Article 40 of the European 
Economic Agreement.231  The Netherlands is not alone in terms of being brought before 
the court.  There is also an infringement case against France regarding foreign charities.232  
VI. WAKE AFTER PERSCHE WITHIN THE EU 
Most EU member states have revised their charitable laws in light of Persche to 
allow tax-deductible donations to be made to either domestic charities or to those formed 
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within other EU member states.233  Sweden still does not extend this tax benefit to any 
charity.234  It was not a foregone conclusion that the member states had to adopt this 
change.  The main challenge for countries choosing to loosen the grip of the notion of 
territoriality, as one may imagine, is how to determine whether a foreign charity is 
equivalent enough to a domestic one.235  Although conformity with the ruling has resulted 
in additional cost and burden to donors, the ECJ has pre-empted complaints by noting both 
were only fair if such donors wanted the benefit of a tax deduction or alternatively, the 
foreign charities could absorb such costs.236  Germany has decided that a foreign charity 
that has a public benefit activity outside of Germany must show that such activity supports 
German permanent residents or benefits Germany’s reputation. 237   In so choosing, 
Germany has taken the exit door that the Persche court and Stauffer court provided.238  This 
type of territoriality is one permitted under both courts since it does not involve 
discrimination between foreign and German charities.239  Under Germany’s new law, the 
taxpayer in Persche would lose.240  Germany’s approach seeks to yield to lost tax base only 
when German public interest is fostered.241  In effect, Germany is seeking to assure it will 
receive in public benefit what it has lost in terms of tax revenue by granting a deduction. 
CONCLUSION 
HOW PERSCHE SHOULD AFFECT CROSS-BORDER GIVING IN THE US 
The current US charitable law regarding the deductibility of donations to foreign 
charities violates Persche through over-reliance and emphasis on the notion of 
territoriality.  Under Persche, if a US donor made a donation to a foreign charity and 
provided the IRS with written evidence that the foreign charity was equivalent to a US 
charity, he/she should be able to receive a tax deduction in the US.242  The mechanics of 
compliance and prevention of terrorist funding are merited concerns, which will be 
addressed fully in Part II of this series.  Assuming both may be met satisfactorily, there is 
no reason for the US not to adopt Persche.   
The US has entered into the bilateral treaties mentioned earlier which effectively 
provide the same extension of benefits set forth in Persche to the three relevant countries.243  
One may note that it seems strange that the US would be willing to extend tax benefits to 
a US charity that conducts all of its charitable activity abroad but not to a foreign charity 
that may/may not benefit its own citizens. 244   In Dutch law (and now in Germany’s 
opposition to extending such benefits to foreign charities that do not benefit its residents 
or reputation), one perceives a type of logic that sees the exchange as an economic 
tradeoff.245  The US’s position should be revised or modified to provide some consistency.  
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Regardless of the US theory of what a charitable deduction is, it is clear that not 
allowing even a prescribed set of foreign charities, i.e., as the Netherlands does, to take in 
tax deductible donations while extending that ability to US charities conducting their entire 
charitable activity outside of its borders, is inconsistent.  The US has already abandoned 
its firm adherence to the notion of territoriality as recently as 2010.  The US loosened the 
tie of the notion of territoriality in certain emergency situations, notably after the Haiti and 
Chile earthquakes during that year.246  In regard to possible terrorist concerns, which will 
be discussed in Part II of this series along with implementation, at least one scholar has 
noted that the US would improve its reputation and deter such activity by taking steps in 
the philanthropic context that would promote a positive conception in the global 
community.247  As Simon, Chisolm, and Dale have stated, “Congress has never provided a 
satisfactory explanation for a rule that, at least on gross examination, has an isolationist 
scent and that is, on the other hand, easily bypassed.”248  A decision to extend tax benefits 
along the lines of Persche through appropriate means would be crucial to improving the 
image of the US and to ensuring the European Union does not consider its efforts to be 
taken in vain.   
The US sets the tone in terms of quantitative giving, and it is likely that other 
countries are looking to its policies in determining their qualitative response to Persche.  
In terms of monitoring, the presence of a US address and perhaps a few board members 
does little to regulate charitable activity that is carried out solely in another country.249  
Instead, the US could look to whether the foreign charity is benefitting the US either 
directly or indirectly (e.g., because it is addressing a global concern) similar to the (soon 
to be modified) Dutch and German approach.  In an even better move to advance global 
philanthropy, the US should consider adopting the approach advanced in Persche, i.e., 
allowing a US donor that shows a donation was made to the substantial equivalent of a US 
charity to receive a tax deduction upon submission of proper evidence.250  Finally, what 
about the voice of philanthropic American people?  Arguably, most US donors would want 
deductions for donations made to foreign charities that are addressing global problems or 
attempting to assist the US.  The US is a leader in terms of innovation and compassionate 
upholding of global justice.  US laws in regard to cross-border charitable giving should 
reflect its distinct position and policies. 
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